Critical Review of 12 years of SΡS Code implementation

....the isps code has fail in mora then 50 issues..... but I will say is too much. Isps is good where there is a security issue, and has proven that has not any real effect inside national waters. Who thinks that Isps can be implemented in a port which a vessel once a month is calling?? All principles of the code cannot be followed in such cases, especially where national flag ships of internal trade are using ports where the code implies. Reminds me , the guard who looks only in one side, where all the dirty game, is done behind his back. Amateur fishermen are along the fences and some of them, they are also entering in the port facility, without any one to disturb ... them.  The code has been relaxed dangerously, and real issues plus modifications of the whole system has to be arranged. Has been proved that a sole code,of security cannot stand, because of the various situations around the world. I may think a main body, with addons for  various situations, otherwise will remain in force a code without results in the 85% of the world . To understand how seriously taken the matter of  security, look how seafarers are trained, and how many real drills done on board.

Below article found in safety4sealog  issue 18

The ISPS Code was Intrοduced by ΙΜΟ ίη 2002 following the 9/11 attacks ίη the US and formed by a diplomatic conference making a 100+ ρρ document plus mandatory SOLAS amendments an international requirement. The Code was set for implementation after 18 months (οα July 1st, 2014) requiring for every ship an ISPS certification, valid for 5 years and a continuous synopsis record.

After more than a twelve (12) years of ISPS Code implementation it would be safe to conclude that, since introduction and implementation, there has been no impact on the any key security threat that the code designed to fight, including but not limited to:

1.     Piracy and armed robbery 2.Stowaways, illegal immigrants and refugees Smuggling of drugs, weapons etc.

4~ Cargo theft mainly ίπ ports and  5..Money laundering via shipping activities

It seems that the code missed to treat any real life threat. More interesting, the introduction of the Code has failed to address important issues such as piracy and armed robbery. There can be
ησ better counter argument than the fact that Key Industry Associations have stepped forward with ΒΜΡ, along other important initiative including naval presence to handle piracy in West and East Africa. The several deficiencies of the Code (the documentation Ιs indicative and in no way exhaustive) may be divided Ιnto three key areas:

Design problems Implementation problems Monitoring problems

Design problems

The Design problems that create the necessary background for the code to malfunction include:

The Code is crew hungry, i,e. Ιτ is addressing the security topics οπ large ships (manning wise), however the case of applying the same principles on ocean going ships where no security threat may be imminent Ιn the majority of a passage or even worse to smaller costal trading ships
with minimal crew, Ιt is a major issue.

The acknowledgement from the code that the other party (ship or Port facility) may not be implementing the Code,  i.e allowing the security level to be zero.

~ The missing enforcement on the distinction or the separate role between SSO and the Master. As it is not common to expect a Master το act as Safety Officer a similar principle should
be applied to ISPS.  The cost of Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) functionality is a key issue as usually it ίs malfunctioning resulting to unnecessary alerts, while ση the other hand there is no additional security when using the SSAS.

 The format and concept of Declaration of Security (DOS) ίs problematic, while it should normally be like a ship/shore or ship/ship security check list, instead Ιt Ιs a vogue document that
normally is required to be completed when the other party is at different security level (i,e. ίπ case of no plan from the other party who will be responsible to sign DoS?).

The X-ray scanning for unaccompanied baggage on required.

 Danielle Centeno, Asst. VP, Loss Prevention & Survey Compliance, American Club, analyzed the "risks of a paperless chart system and incidents resulting from the improper use of ECDISI! there will be more vessels embracing electronic navigational charts as the primary means of
navigation over a paper chart system. Ιn this presentation, Μr Centeno explored three different grounding incidents resulting from the improper use of ECDISI!

Stelios Bellas, Director, Hellenic Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (ΗΒΜ- CI), discussed about the subject of "Marine accidents and Human Factor". He stated that most casualties are the result either of equipment failure on human error but commonly Ιt is a combination of both, with human error to be the dominant factor. The reason behind any specific casualty Ιt in most cases complex and hard to attribute to a single cause. He noted that accidents are mostly due to mistakes of a single person, but in fact the whole organization is involved, both onboard and ashore. While the immediate cause of an accident may be the result of the actions of an individual these frequently are the result of factors in the local work environment which are a consequence of organizations factors.

Panel Να. 5 - Security
Aposto!os Belokas, Founder & Managing Editor, SAFETY- 4SEA, provided a "Critical Review of 12 years of ISPS Code implementation" highlighting a wide number of deficiencies ίη way of design, implementation and monitoring of the Code, concluding that the Code has failed to address any rea! life threat such as piracy & armed robbery, stowaways, smuggling of weapons/drugs, cargo theft and money laundering

He noted that there's ηο ΙΜΟ feedback οα ISPS Code revision and/or implementation so far and that the industry BMPs for Anti-Piracy are not tuned \\'ith the Code, conc!uding that the ISPS Code need to be revisited and or generally ονerhauled under new light.

Dimitrios Maniatis. business Deνelοpmeηt manager, Diaplous Maritime Services,
provided an overview of the "Piracy status East and West of Africa". Ηε stated that although
ίυ the ear!y days MarSec was an inspiring business, ίη reality no οηe knew what they were
doing. For Somalia, he noted KPI's indicate that the risk of a resurgence of Somali based piracy is inevitable. Then, he focused οη the piracy ίη Nigeria and in some misconceptions that exist for their activity. Ηe referred to recent reported ίηcidents in the area and closed
his presentation with advice οn what maritime security measures can be implemented.

Rod Lingard, J oint Managing Director, Thomas Miller War Risks Services Ltd, gave a presentation entitling the "Anatomy of West African maritime kidnap" to explain why kidnap-
ping for ransom has increased recently ίη the Gulf of Guinea and assess whether this ίη-
crease ννίΙΙ continue. The Gulf of Guinea is currently thought to be the most dangerous region for seafarers. According to a recent report by Oceans Beyond Piracy, the total number of  kidnaps for ransom during 2016 ίη the Gulf of Guinea has already surpassed the total number of incidents recorded by the International Maritime Bureau (ΙΜΒ) for 2015. Mr Lingard described what happens during a kidnapping and Ρroνίded some insight into the training a\'ai!ab!e for shipping
companies and cre\l·s.

Panel Νο. 6 - Human Element
Mar!on Rono, President, .'I,'lagsaysay Ρεορ!ε Resources Corporation & Executive Chairman,
Magsaysay Maritime Corporaιίοιι, presented the "Training and Development Challenges"
from the crew manager perspective. Ηε noted that the current global shipping crisis is equally
challenging for crew managers as ship owners and managers continue to implement ways
to reduce costs, including crew wages and benefits reduction, re-organization, downsizing of
crew complement and suspension of training and development initiatives. However, Mr
Rono highlighted that training and development should remain indispensable because as
trade becomes complex and as the world moves toward digitalization, there is a great need
to be able to supply seafarers whose skills meet the technical requirements of modern
vessels and the commercial needs of ship owners and their customers. As far as vessel οperation is concerned, having the right pεοplε who can do the job right remains to be the greatest  competitive advantage οne can have. Το help address the talent shortage reported by BIMCO,

Mr Rono adYisec to put Ιιι efforts οf
next generation of : promote seagoing (Adam Lewis, Μar:ations & Training,
Maritime Emp!oye:Ltd, focused Ιιίε prese:-_the "Recruitment anc - of Generation Ζ". Mr. =- Ξ' .: C
p!ained that those bon:2001 and 2011 are CC::o:': C - ο - as Generation Ζ. Ιυ .2:: - :"'Ά C
ννίΙΙ reach the age of ::. :...-_ they may start to be :Ξ::- __ ::: ίαιο cadet programmes

wide. Ηε stated that the between developments intime education and the experiment of a more technologic:advanced generation, may lead to greater advances : maritime safety. Therefore.  5 years' time, cadets may τιο; learning collision regulation:.s from books, but instead be simclating thousands of scenarios οτ; a simple tablet deνίce. This combjinatiοn could lead to much greater competence and ill1derstanding. resulting ί:: safer generations.

Michae! Rοss  Norsafe Academy focusec οn the "New SOLAS requirements for lifeboat servicing". Ηe referred to the new resolution and amendment to SOLAS approved by ΙΜΟ regarding requirements for periodic service of lifesaving equipmenr. Μι Rossland explained that this resolution requires documented competency and approval of personnel conducting services and outlined necessary actions for vessels, shipowners, flag, class and servicing companies to comply.

At event closure, Apostolos Belokas as the Forum Chairman, thanked all delegates for their participation as well as the sponsors for their support and the speakers for their excellent presentations. Μι Belokas also congratulated all wίnners and short -listed nominees
of the SAFETY 4SEA Awards for their contribution to a safer ίηdustry.

Explore more at event's dedicated webpage … https//goo.gl/61MOeh ,the ocean going cargo ships

ι!!ι! The familiarization and training as the two provisions of the code (B.13.3 and B.13.4) are located in Part Β (i.e. not mandatory). ι!!ι! The not realistic/practical
approach οα the designation of restricted areas as the code is to descriptive

ίJIj Ship Auditing interval by RSO at 2.5 years as the in- terval is way too extended,
taking into consideration that ye shore side is not audited, similar to the ISM Code

ι!!ι! CSO and Office are not being audited/certified, indicating a week security link

I!i Missing requirements for a Security Muster List station Bill for security emergencies

Β Conflicting guidance οτι the close out max date for the NCRs (it should be immediate if the physical security of the ship may be or actually breached and three months in any other circumstances)Inadequate guidance and overall management of the port side compliance with the code

Implementation problems
Implementation problems range, in way of:

ij!iJ Plan Confidentiality: If crew cannot access SSP openly how are they going to be
trained/familiarized?

ίJIj SSA & Οα Scene Security Surveys are dealt as paper exercises in most instances

ίJIj Missing Drill instructions and guidance for the crew members with security
duties involved (who, why, and what is expected out of them along with performance standards)

ίJIj Inadequate internal auditing resulting in zero NCRs in most cases

ίJIj Inadequate description of  the CSO background (previous experience, years in position or fleet size or background vetting). Contradictions between SSP & BMPs as in many cases ηο additional security team description is included in the SSPs, set aside the issue of fire arms onboard

Monitoring problems
Monitoring problems, include but not limited to:

ίJIj Four (4) security levels in operation, including the case of the other party not
implementing the Code

ίJIj USA is the only place where dedicated Security Inspections are being conducted
by the USCG

l11iJ SSAS not functioning properly making the monitoring
issue a nightmare for both    CSOs & Flag states

l11iJ Missing familiarization and training of office staff, other than the CSO (e.g. marineoperations, technical staff)

Ιη conclusion, the Code has failed to address 50 far any real life challenges. Αs a result, there is a contradiction between ΒΜΡ5 and SSP: the
industry and regulators make significantly slow moves with respect to West Africa situation and cyber security and there is additional paper work.
This is why ΙΜΟ should collect, analyze and distribute lessons learned and industry feedback οn a quarterly basis. There should be co-ordination center per area globally and the SSAS role should be reviewed. Ιn general, the ISPS Code should be generally overhauled under the new light so as the Code to be significantly reduced in size in the range of 20-30 pages. Finally, the ISM Code could be amended as well to include an additional security paragraph dealing with all these issues.